Maier K.A., Rohde H., Stegemann B., Umbreit H., McMurry D.S., Osers E., Falla P.S. (eds.) Germany and the Second World War. Volume 2. Germany's Initial Conquests in Europe

New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. — 441 p.WITH the second volume of Germany and the Second World War we begin an account ofthe military events ofthe conflict that was deliberately unleashed by Nazi Germany. The first year of the war, dealt with in this volume, took quite a different course from that which the German dictator had intended, notwithstanding his readiness to take extreme risks; but it led to triumphant successes that hardly anyone had believed possible. At the same time, the establishment of hegemony on the European continent confronted the aggressor with ever new problems; above all it did not bring about the end of war, though this was still essentially confined to Europe. Only to a small extent could Germany's victory on the battlefields be converted into political capital.
The first volume of the present work was divided into four parts describing the build-up ofthe German war-machine, over a long period ofyears, from the respective points of view of ideology and propaganda, the economy, rearmament, and foreign policy. Volume II, by contrast, traces the history of the war up to the late autumn of 1940, for the most part as a consecutive account of interconnected political and military events. The account of the successive campaigns-the invasion of Poland, the occupation of Denmark and Norway, and the attack in the west-is complemented by a description of naval and air operations in so far as these were not directly connected with the actions ofthe land forces. To explain the strategy of the German air force and navy it has sometimes been necessary to go a long way back into prewar developmeIits. In addition, treatment of the war at sea required a different timescale. Whereas the volume as a whole ends with the failure of direct strategy against Britain and the decision to invade the Soviet Union, the account of naval operations continues until the spring of 1941, when the second phase of the 'Battle of the Atlantic' was coming to an end.
It is not the purpose ofthis volume to give a comprehensive picture ofthe history of Germany during the first stages of the war. The factors affecting strategyeconomic, technical, social, and ideological, problems oforganization and domestic policy-are only referred to in so far as is necessary for an understanding of war events. Their importance is so great that they require fuller study, to which subsequent 'cross-section' volumes will be devoted. However, Part I of the present volume attempts to survey the politico-strategic scene and, in line with the first volume, to clarify the connection ofevents that are described more fully in subsequent chapters along with the actual military operations. The latter are treated against the background of Hitler's war policy and in relation to the plans of the German leadership, whether long-term or born of immediate circumstances. This represents a departure from the traditional type of war history; but the general conception of military history nowadays, which the present authors fully share, accords a legitimate place to the analysis of operations.
Certainly the conduct ofwar is not equated with the mere movement of armies on battlefields. Military operations were intended to serve more or less clearly formulated political aims, and the authors' first task was to explain these. But an attempt has also been made to describe the military
events ofthe war with exactitude, albeit concisely, so as to facilitate a critical appraisal of them. Numerous maps, tables, and statistics are also provided for this purpose.
The authors hope in this way to have depicted the belligerents' intentions and resources, the execution and outcome of their plans, in such a way as to make clear the reasons for success or failure in each case. It was deliberately decided not to go further and give a complete account of military events in the style of a chronicle. Like the work as a whole, Volume II is addressed not so much to specialized historians as to a wider circle of readers interested in contemporary events. The former have at their disposal an almost inexhaustible quantity of monographs, and easy access to archives if they wish to investigate military events that have been somewhat neglected by scholars despite the multiplicity of publications. The present authors, on the other hand, have in mind primarily readers who seek information about a period that most of them did not experience directly, but in which the fate of Germany and Europe was decided and the basis created for the present confrontation of the two superpowers. The reader is not deprived of an interpretation of events in the light of present-day research; but the intention is to describe them on a uniform basis, rather than to concentrate on particular 'key issues' with a discussion of existing theories concerning them.Volume I
Volume III
Volume IV
Volume V
Volume VI
Volume VII
Volume VIII
Volume IX-I
Volume IX-II