National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1984. — 308 p.
This is a very interesting account of various episodes in pre-WWII Red Army history. Apparently it was written by a couple of dissident Soviet historians during the Cold War and smuggled out of the Soviet Union by an American student. Because of this context the book is not as heavily footnoted as typical with books on this subject (which are typically based on archival research, memoirs, etc.); what makes this book interesting is that in addition to documented evidence on various topics. Events after they have occurred become the subjects of investigation. Historians want to know what caused Napoleon to lead the Grande Armée on its catastrophic march to Moscow . Defending their opinions they polemicize bitterly, suggest reasons, cite facts. Even if they, as is usually the case, do not find a single formula, still the general understanding of history is enriched with points of view and conceptions. The destruction of the Red Army was, in its consequences for the nation, Stalin's most important act. To date it has been very little researched. In the preceding parts of this book we have tried to describe the path that led to this army's catastrophe. Now we will talk of the catastrophe itself. Without access to the most important documents we will not be able t o discuss the problems with the depth we would like . We will try to re-establish the course of events and suggest probable causes.